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In this paper we use a novel approach and a large Portuguese employer-employee panel 
data set to study the hypothesis that industrial agglomeration improves the quality of the firm-
worker matching process. Our method makes use of recent developments in the estimation 
and analysis of models with high-dimensional fixed effects. Using wage regressions with 
controls for multiple sources of observed and unobserved heterogeneity we find little 
evidence that the quality of matching increases with firm’s clustering within the same 
industry. This result supports Freedman’s (2008) analysis using U.S. data. 
 
 
JEL Classification:  R12, R39, J31 
  





Douglas Woodward  
Division of Research and Department of Economics 
Moore School of Business 
University of South Carolina 
Columbia, SC 29208 
USA 
E-mail: woodward@moore.sc.edu   
 
                                                 
* The authors acknowledge the support of FCT, the Portuguese Foundation for Science and Technology. 1 Introduction
Urban economists have long proposed that three sources of external scale economies
explain the bene￿ts of industry agglomeration, which are external to the ￿rm, but
internal to an industry concentrated in a particular region [Marshall (1890)]. The
￿rst is the potential for more extensive interaction between suppliers and buyers,
allowing for vertical disintegration and supplier specialization that leads to higher
productivity within the area. The second is a ￿rm￿ s ability to capture industry-
speci￿c knowledge and information spillovers resulting from the close proximity of
similar ￿rms and other economic agents. The third is labor market pooling, where
agglomeration improves each ￿rm￿ s productivity because it increases the quantity of
available labor skills and the quality of the ￿rm-worker matching process.
Alfred Marshall￿ s concept of external scale economies underlies much theoretical
work, including contributions to our understanding of long-run economic growth, in-
ternational trade, and economic geography [for example, Rivera-Batiz (1988), Krug-
man (1991), Venables (1996), Rodr￿guez-Clare (1996) and Hanson (1996)]. Echoing
Marshall (1890), the theoretical literature emphasizes increasing returns for ￿rms
stemming from some form of industry-speci￿c external economies.
As for the empirical research, Rosenthal & Strange (2004) and Puga (2010) note
that the majority of the evidence for the existence and extent of external economies is
indirect and comes from studies showing excessive localization￿ spatial concentration
over and above what would be expected￿ for a wide range of industries. Work along
this line includes Ellison & Glaeser (1997), Maurel & Sedillot (1999), Devereux et al.
(2004), Duranton & Overman (2005) and Guimarªes et al. (2007). More direct evi-
dence has been obtained in studies comparing wages across areas [Wheaton & Lewis
(2002), Combes et al. (2008), Freedman (2008) and Mion & Naticchioni (2009)]. The
1idea is that higher wages in clusters re￿ ect higher ￿rm productivity resulting from
industry-speci￿c external economies. Indeed, these higher wages would lead ￿rms
to relocate elsewhere unless there were some signi￿cant compensating productivity
advantages in areas where industries agglomerate [Glaeser & MarØ (2001)].1
Relying on wage data to uncover evidence for industry-speci￿c external scale
economies raises some considerable challenges. A ￿rst problem is that observed
and non-observed abilities of workers may vary across areas. If better workers sort
into clusters, then the wage premium may indicate workers￿greater abilities, not
any intrinsic externalities from clustering [Glaeser & MarØ (2001); Combes et al.
(2008)]. Likewise, observed and non-observed qualities of ￿rms might di⁄er across
regions. Better ￿rms may also sort into clusters, leading to higher mean wages in
these areas [Mion & Naticchioni (2009)]. Thus, applied work using wage regressions
should control for the possibility of spatial sorting of ￿rms and workers. In turn, this
approach requires matched employer-employee micro-level data.
Wage di⁄erences across areas can also be caused by local non-human endowments
that boost ￿rms￿productivity and the marginal product of workers. Firms in some
areas may exhibit higher productivity because of the natural features of a favorable
location, such as a climate suited to a particular kind of economic activity or the
presence of natural resources in the area [Ellison & Glaeser (1999) and Kim (1999)].
The built environment and human endowments, such as public infrastructure or local
institutions and technology, may also matter. If these forces are at work, then larger
1Glaeser (1999) and Glaeser & MarØ (2001) used wage regressions to look for evidence on urban
(not industry-speci￿c) external economies. They advanced the idea that the skills of ￿rms and
workers evolve more positively over time in urban areas, the so-called ￿learning hypothesis.￿ A
more direct approach to gauge the importance of external economies (urban or industry-speci￿c)
relied on productivity measures [e.g. Ciccone & Hall (1996), Ciccone (2002) and Henderson (2003)].
2mean wages in clusters may not indicate the presence of industry-speci￿c external
scale economies. In addition, we should be aware that although empirical evidence
on a wage premium may support the existence of productivity gains associated with
external economies, the lack of evidence on such premium does not mean these
economies are absent. Roback (1982) showed that the presence of local endowments,
like natural or consumption amenities, will make workers more willing to accept lower
wages. Thus, these localized amenities can o⁄set the positive impact of industry-
speci￿c external economies, rendering the net e⁄ect on wages ambiguous.
In applied studies researchers must also take into account the possibility that the
wage premium in clusters can be related to productivity gains associated with urban
external economies [Jacobs (1969)]. These are economic bene￿ts that accrue from
the agglomeration of general economic activity, not from the spatial concentration
of a particular industry.
Another empirical problem is disentangling the three sources of external economies
originally proposed by Marshall (1890). The di¢ culty arises because all the three
sources￿ vertical disintegration, knowledge spillovers, and better quality of the ￿rm-
worker matching process￿ share the prediction that productivity increases with the
scale of an industry at a location, allowing ￿rms to pay higher wages. This "observa-
tional equivalence" [Rosenthal & Strange (2004)] makes it complicated to distinguish
the three main causes of industry-speci￿c external economies using wage regressions.
Thus, higher wages in industrial clusters, after controlling for the spatial sorting of
both ￿rms and workers, local human and non-human endowments, and urban exter-
nal economies, can be seen as evidence that either one, two, or all three sources of
external economies proposed by Marshall (1890) are at work.
In this paper we use wage regression analysis to test the Marshallian hypothesis
that industrial clustering improves the quality of the ￿rm-worker matching process. A
3major advantage is the availability of a large Portuguese panel data base, with linked
employer-employee information. Our work is in line with Andersson et al. (2007) and
Mion & Naticchioni (2009), who also used wage regressions and micro-level data to
examine the hypothesis that matching improves with agglomeration. Unlike us,
however, these authors examined the relationship across urban agglomerations, not
industrial clusters. Both studies computed match quality as the correlation between
estimates of ￿rm quality and its mean worker quality for each area. They then
related this correlation with a measure of urban agglomeration (employment density
across areas).2 The two papers present con￿ icting evidence. Andersson et al. (2007)
found a positive relation between match quality and urban agglomeration using data
for California and Florida, while Mion & Naticchioni (2009) uncovered a negative
relationship relying on an Italian data set.
The main problem with these two studies has to do with their estimates of worker
and ￿rm quality. Andersson et al.￿ s (2007) estimates are based on comprehensive
data sets and on a wage regression that includes two high-dimensional ￿xed e⁄ects
(￿rm and worker) following Abowd et al.￿ s (1999) model and econometric proce-
dures.3 On the other hand, the sampling procedure and relatively small size of Mion
& Naticchioni￿ s (2009) data base prevents them from using Abowd et al.￿ s (1999)
speci￿cation. Thus, their estimates of worker quality are based on a regression with
a single ￿xed e⁄ect for worker, while ￿rm quality is proxied by a measure of ￿rm
size.
Recent work has convincingly argued that in the presence of unobserved worker,
2Andersson et al. (2007) also analyzed the relationship between matching and urban agglomer-
ation using a productivity approach.
3See also Abowd, Lengermann & McKinney (2002). The estimates of these individual ￿xed
e⁄ects are used to measure the quality of each worker and ￿rm.
4￿rm, and match heterogeneity, wage regressions that do not control for all these
unobservables may su⁄er from a considerable omitted variable bias [Woodcock (2007)
and Woodcock (2008)]. Thus, the estimates of individual quality of workers and ￿rms
in Andersson et al. (2007) and Mion & Naticchioni (2009) may be plagued by this
problem. As an alternative, Woodcock (2007) proposed the introduction of a worker-
￿rm interaction term (the match-e⁄ect) in Abowd et al.￿ s (1999) model.
So far, the only study that uses micro-level data to test the hypothesis that
the quality of match improves with ￿rms￿clustering within the same industry is
Freedman (2008). Looking at data for a single manufacturing sector of a U.S. state,
the author ￿nds little evidence that the quality of matching increases with ￿rm￿ s
clustering. His inference, however, is based on an ad hoc comparison of results
from a wage regression ￿ la Abowd et al. (1999) with another one that, in line
with Woodcock￿ s (2007) suggestion, also controls for unobservable worker-￿rm match
e⁄ects.
Our paper improves on the existing literature, notably Freedman￿ s (2008) re-
search, by establishing a precise econometric framework to test the relationship be-
tween industrial clustering and matching. Moreover, our results are obtained with a
more comprehensive data set that includes all manufacturing sectors in the economy.
The paper proceeds as follows. We devote the next section to the discussion of our
methodology. Then, in the third section we present the data and some descriptive
statistics. Results are discussed in the fourth section, while section ￿ve concludes
the paper.
52 Econometric Framework
Consider an augmented version of the traditional Mincerian wage equation for a
single worker where we added a term to account for the impact of industry-speci￿c





jt￿ + Lr(j)s(j)t￿ + ’s(j) +  t + "ijt , (1)
where wijt is the wage of worker i, in ￿rm j, at time t. The xit is a vector of
observable worker level characteristics (such as age, education, gender or tenure),
while the zjt is a set of observable ￿rm level attributes (like its size, age or type of
ownership). Other variables include a set of controls (dummies) for time-speci￿c ( t)
and inter-industry (’s(j)) wage di⁄erentials.4 Our variable of interest is Lr(j)s(j)t, a
measure that is introduced in the regression to pick-up a potential wage premium
linked to industry-speci￿c externalities. As argued in the introduction, a proper
speci￿cation should control for urbanization economies, as well as for regional human
and non-human endowments that might a⁄ect individual wages. Thus, we add to
the wage equation in (1) two new variables. The variable ￿r(j) in equation (2) is
a dummy variable for each region that accounts for time-invariant characteristics
of the areas (including climate, natural amenities or other natural resources). This
variable also controls for permanent inter-regional di⁄erences in variables such as
local institutions and technology, infrastructures, or urbanization economies. The
time-varying characteristics of the regions are picked up by the variable Ur(j)t. Thus,





jt￿ + Lr(j)s(j)t￿ + Ur(j)t￿ + ￿r(j) + ’s(j) +  t + "ijt . (2)
4In equation (1) s stands for ￿rms￿sector of activity and r for region. We adopt the convention of
using parentheses in the subscripts to specify the source of variation in each variable. For example,
the ultimate source of variation in ’s(j) are the ￿rms (j).
6Estimation of the above speci￿cation may produce biased results. The problem
is that non-observed abilities of workers and ￿rms may be correlated with the regres-
sors. At the same time, as already noted, if these unobserved abilities are positively
correlated with the Lr(j)s(j)t, then higher wages in clusters may be a result of spatial
sorting of workers and ￿rms based on unobservables, not industry-speci￿c external
economies. As proposed by Abowd et al. (1999), with a large matched employer-
employee panel data set it is possible to account for the non-observable characteristics
of workers and ￿rms. This can be done by adding two ￿xed e⁄ects, one speci￿c to the





jt￿ + Lr(j)s(j)t￿ + Ur(j)t￿ +  t + ￿i + ￿j + "ijt , (3)
where we note that those variables that change only with j, ￿r(j) and ’s(j), are com-
pletely absorbed by the ￿rm ￿xed e⁄ect. The introduction of these two ￿xed e⁄ects
will also assimilate all other time-invariant observable characteristics of workers and
￿rms that might a⁄ect wages. With a high-dimensional data set, estimation of a
linear regression model with two ￿xed e⁄ects poses some computational challenges
[see Abowd et al. (1999)]. However, the exact least-square solution to this problem
can be found using an algorithm proposed by Guimarªes & Portugal (2010).
As shown by Woodcock (2007), results obtained with speci￿cation (3) may be sub-
ject to substantial bias if unobservable ￿rm-worker match characteristics are impor-
tant determinants of wages. Following Woodcock (2007), we introduce an additional
term in the regression (￿ij) that accounts for the speci￿c ￿rm-worker interaction.






jt￿ + Lr(j)s(j)t￿ + Ur(j)t￿ +  t + ￿i + ￿j + ￿ij + "ijt . (4a)
7Estimation of a model such as this poses some problems. As is, the model is
overparameterized making it impossible to disentangle the three e⁄ects. In this
model a good match may be indistinguishable from a good worker working in a good
￿rm. In other words, without any restriction on the parameters, ￿ij absorbs the





jt￿ + Lr(j)s(j)t￿ + Ur(j)t￿ +  t + !ij + "ijt , (4b)
that includes a single ￿xed e⁄ect for the interaction, !ij, will capture the three e⁄ects
and provide the same ￿t as (4a), i.e., identical estimates for ￿, ￿, ￿, ￿ and  .
However, we have to keep in mind that our main interest is in the relation between
￿ij and Lr(j)s(j)t, after controlling for all other explanatory variables in equation (4a).















j + "ijt . (5)
One way to test for this relationship would be using a two-step procedure. In the
￿rst step we would obtain estimates of ￿ij from (4a). Then, in a second step, these
estimates would be regressed in the other explanatory variables. Although intuitive,
this approach faces a di¢ culty. Because the model is overparameterized, to separate
the three e⁄ects it is necessary to impose restrictions on the parameters associated
with the ￿xed e⁄ects in order to obtain estimates of ￿ij. Conceivably, there are many
ways in which these restrictions can be imposed, and the estimates of ￿ij will depend
on the restriction.5 An interesting result we obtained when studying this problem is
that the results of a regression between the estimated ￿ij and all other explanatory
variables in (4a) will be invariant to the type of parameterization used for the ￿xed
5For example, Woodcock (2007) suggests a strategy for identi￿cation of ￿ij based on an assump-
tion of orthogonality between the match-e⁄ect and the ￿rm and worker e⁄ects.
8e⁄ects (see Appendix A for a proof of this result). Thus, this two-step procedure is
feasible without being a⁄ected by the type of parameterization we will use.
In Appendix B, we also show that the coe¢ cients of a regression between the
estimated ￿ij and all other explanatory variables in equation (4a) can be obtained
directly by comparing the estimated coe¢ cients of (3) and (4b). This result provides
an alternative way to obtain our coe¢ cient of interest, the ￿￿ in equation (5). More
speci￿cally, to obtain this coe¢ cient we need only to subtract the estimated ￿ ob-
tained in (4b) from that obtained in (3). To infer about the statistical signi￿cance of
the di⁄erence in the coe¢ cients we can then make use of a test proposed by Gelbach
(2009).6
3 Data and Descriptive Statistics
We use a survey of workers, ￿rms and establishments collected in October of every
year during a reference week by the Portuguese Ministry of Employment, the Quadros
do Pessoal data base. This is a mandatory survey for every ￿rm operating in Por-
tugal, except family businesses without wage-earners. Public administration is not
covered and the coverage in agriculture is low, given the small share of businesses
with wage-earners. For the other sectors, however, the mandatory nature of the
survey leads to an extremely high response rate. The data set includes precise in-
formation on ￿rm and establishment location, sector of activity, type of ownership,
actual employment, and the characteristics of the workforce. For every single worker
6See section 7 in Gelbach (2009), in particular footnote 22. The second-step regression we
described above can be interpreted as the auxiliary regression associated with Gelbach￿ s (2009)
decomposition. He shows that the asymptotic t-tests of this regression can be seen as an extended
version of a Hausman test.
9the reported data encompasses earnings and other personal information such as gen-
der, age, tenure, and years of schooling. A unique worker identi￿cation code, based
on a transformation of the social security number, allows for the tracking of workers
over time. Similarly, unique identi￿ers for ￿rms and establishments enables con-
necting data throughout the years. Matching of ￿rms, establishments and workers￿
identi￿ers is also possible.
We constructed a panel of workers using data from 1995 through 2006.7 We then
restricted data to the manufacturing sector in the continental part of the Portuguese
territory. Extensive checks on the consistency of the data were implemented following
the methodology described in Cardoso & Portela (2009). Next, we trimmed the top
and bottom one percent of the wages in each year to avoid problems with outliers
and retained only wage-earners working full-time.8 To ensure comparability of the
estimates of the ￿xed e⁄ects, we restricted the data set to the largest connected
group.9 In our data, the largest connected group accounts for 95.8 percent of the
observations.
Some basic descriptive statistics of our panel are shown in Table 1. We have a to-
tal of 5,245,296 worker-year observations. Columns 2 and 3 in this table show means
7Data was restricted to this period of time to avoid changes in the Portuguese Standard Industrial
Classi￿cation system (CAE). Throughout this period the Portuguese CAE Rev.2 classi￿cation
remained in place. Worker-level data for 2001 is unavailable in the Quadros do Pessoal. Thus, our
panel covers a period of eleven years.
8If in a single year the worker is found in more than one establishment we keep the observation
where the highest number of worked hours is reported.
9Estimates of the ￿xed e⁄ects obtained for the regression model with two ￿xed-e⁄ects are only
comparable within the same group. Groups are de￿ned as the set of observations comprising all
the workers that ever belonged to any ￿rm in the group and all the ￿rms that employed any worker
in the group. Identi￿cation of the groups has been implemented using the algorithm in Abowd,
Creecy & Kramarz (2002).
10and standard deviations calculated across all observations, the "Weighted Sample."
To furnish more meaningful statistics we also report these metrics calculated on the
averages of time-values ￿the "Unweighted Sample" ￿gures in columns 4 and 5. As
shown in column 4, the 1,005,886 workers in our sample have an average real hourly
wage of 4.4 euros ￿using a 2009 de￿ ator.10 Table 1 also shows statistics for the
observable worker characteristics we will use in our regressions. School1 to School8
are dummy variables and Tenure is de￿ned as the number of consecutive years in
the same establishment.
In our regressions we included establishment ￿xed e⁄ects. However, we control
for ￿rm level observable characteristics such as size and type of ownership. Size is
de￿ned as the number of full-time workers in the ￿rm and there are three types
of ownership (Private, Public and Foreign), according to the majority in the ￿rm￿ s
capital structure. These variables are relevant because the real hourly wage of workers
may depend on the characteristics of the ￿rms to which establishments belong.11
[insert Table 1 about here]
Our variable of interest, Specialization, is computed at the concelho (county) level
and using a three-digit breakdown of the Portuguese Standard Industrial Classi￿ca-
tion system (105 industries).12 We calculated this variable using two alternative ways,
10Wage is calculated as the sum of the base wage plus all other regularly paid components. To
obtain hourly values, we divided by the number of normal working hours. Comparison of the ￿gures
for the real hourly wage in columns 2 and 4 indicates that workers that remain more years in the
panel are remunerated above those who stay for shorter periods of time.
11Note, for example, that a worker in an establishment of a large ￿rm is likely to be paid more
than another that works in an equally sized establishment of a smaller ￿rm.
12The concelho is a Portuguese administrative region roughly equivalent to the U.S. county, but
with a smaller average area. Throughout our period of analysis the number of concelhos increased
11employment or counts of establishments in the same industry and region. Typically,
industry-speci￿c externalities are captured with employment data [e.g. Wheaton
& Lewis (2002), Combes et al. (2008), Freedman (2008) and Mion & Naticchioni
(2009)]. In these studies, regional employment in each industry, is often introduced
in the regressions as a density measure (divided by the area of the region) or as a
share (with total regional employment in the denominator). We opted to include
all these three variables individually in the regressions (Specialization, Area and Ur-
banization) in order to allow for a more ￿ exible speci￿cation. The inclusion of total
regional employment (Urbanization) serves an additional purpose. This variable
picks up the e⁄ect of time-varying characteristics of the regions such as urbanization
economies, infrastructure, and other local amenities that may a⁄ect productivity and
wages.
As argued in Figueiredo et al. (2009) and Figueiredo et al. (2010), use of employment-
based measures to account for industry-speci￿c external economies has a draw-
back. These measures encompass both ￿rm internal scale economies and external
economies. Consider, for example, a region with a cluster of 1,000 small ￿rms with
one worker when compared with another with a single large ￿rm with 1,000 work-
ers. In the second case, we do not have any cluster of ￿rms and the level of the
employment variable is entirely explained by internal returns to scale. Hence, as
an alternative to overcome this limitation of employment-based measures, we also
compute Specialization as the count of establishments in each industry and region.
from 275 to 278. The three new concelhos were created by aggregating parts of ￿ve existing ones.
We overcame this problem by grouping together the a⁄ected concelhos and ended up with 273
regions. Our panel only includes data for 272 of these regions because one was dropped for lack of
observations.
124 Results
In Table 2 we show regression results using our preferred speci￿cation ￿with Spe-
cialization measured as a count of establishments by industry and region. All non-
dummy variables are introduced in logs. In Columns (1) and (2), we present simple
wage regressions that indicate a raw wage premium for clustering. Whether or not
we adjust for the area of the regions, the elasticity of wages is around 0.01. Dou-
bling the number of establishments in a region leads to an increase of wages in the
same industry of about one percent. The last four columns follow the sequence of
equations 1-4 presented in Section 2.13 Column (3) shows the estimates for a tra-
ditional Mincerian equation, which includes observable characteristics of the worker
and the ￿rm. Goodness of ￿t improves and the coe¢ cient on Specialization increases
slightly. All other estimated coe¢ cients are in line with expectations. Wages are
higher for males, older workers (peaking around the age of 58), and increase with
tenure and education. There is also a wage premium for working in larger ￿rms,
public companies, and especially foreign-owned ￿rms.
As argued before, a proper speci￿cation should account for urbanization economies,
as well as for regional endowments that might a⁄ect productivity and individual earn-
ings. Thus, in column (4), we add two new controls: A set of individual dummies
for regions and the Urbanization variable. The dummies are intended to account
for time-invariant characteristics of the regions (e.g. climate, amenities or natural
resources). These variables also pick permanent interregional di⁄erences in regional
characteristics such as institutions, technology and infrastructures. The other vari-
13All models were estimated by ordinary least squares with a cluster-robust correction to the
standard-errors. This correction accounts for possible unobserved correlation between repeated
observations (i.e. the same worker in di⁄erent years) and produces rather conservative t-statistics.
13able, Urbanization, controls for urbanization economies and related time-varying
attributes of the areas. It is interesting to note that the wage premium associated
with the Urbanization variable is around three percent, in line with other studies
[Ciccone & Hall (1996), Ciccone (2002), Combes et al. (2008) and Mion & Natic-
chioni (2009)]. Even though we now rely on variation over time within industries
to identify the relation, we still ￿nd an elasticity for Specialization in line with the
previous regressions. Area is absorbed by the location dummies. These dummies
also serve to mitigate a potential problem of endogeneity due to regional omitted
variables that might be correlated with the other explanatory variables.
Another potential problem, as already discussed, is that non-observed abilities
of workers and establishments may be correlated with the regressors. If these un-
observed abilities are positively associated with Specialization, then higher wages
in clusters may be a result of spatial sorting. Thus, as explained in Section 2, we
introduce two sets of ￿xed e⁄ects, one speci￿c to the worker and the other to the
establishment. This regression is found in column (5).14 The coe¢ cient on Special-
ization drops to less than half its previous values, showing that sorting based on
unobservables matters.
Finally, in column (6), following Woodcock (2007), we introduce an establishment-
worker speci￿c ￿xed-e⁄ect that accounts for match heterogeneity. As indicated in
Section 2, if no restriction is imposed on the coe¢ cients, this match e⁄ect absorbs
the worker and establishment ￿xed e⁄ects, rendering this a model with a single high-
dimensional ￿xed e⁄ect. Note also that the estimates for the model in column (6)
are equivalent to those that would be obtained in a speci￿cation where the three
￿xed e⁄ects (worker, establishment and interaction) were included with appropriate
14The regression was estimated with the Stata user-writen routine reg2hdfe found in the Statistical
Software Components (SSC) from the Boston College Department of Economics.
14restrictions on the coe¢ cients.
[insert Tables 2 and 3 about here]
We are interested in the relation between the establishment-worker match e⁄ect
and Specialization. The coe¢ cient of interest, the ￿￿ in equation (5), Section 2, can
be obtained directly, as shown before, by subtracting the estimated coe¢ cient of
Specialization in column (6) from that on column (5). Thus, the estimate of ￿￿ is
0.00018 (=0.00411-0.00393), indicating that with the doubling of Specialization the
component of wages associated with match-e⁄ects increases 0.018 percent ￿after
controlling for multiple sources of observed and unobserved heterogeneity.
To check whether this result is statistically signi￿cant, we implemented the test
described in Gelbach (2009). In a ￿rst step, we recovered the estimates of the !ij
using the model in equation (4b) (see also column (6) of Table 2) and decomposed
the three e⁄ects that are included in these estimates based on the assumption of
orthogonality between the match e⁄ect and the establishment and worker e⁄ects.15
We then apply the second step regression shown in equation (5). Using this two-step
procedure, we obtain the same 0.00018 for the ￿￿ (as expected) with an associated
p-value of 3.1 percent. Hence, our estimate indicates little evidence that the quality
of matching increases with establishment￿ s clustering within the same industry. The
size of the coe¢ cient is small and the p-value is not signi￿cant at the one percent
level. Similar evidence can be found using our alternative measure of Specialization
based on employment (see Table 3). Here, the di⁄erence in coe¢ cients is 0.00003
and the p-value associated with this di⁄erence is 77.7 percent.
15To do this we followed the approach in Woodcock (2007).
155 Conclusion
In this paper we investigate the Marshallian hypothesis that localization of an in-
dustry improves the ￿rm-worker matching process. To this end, we use a large Por-
tuguese linked employer-employee data set and a novel approach that makes use of
recent developments in the estimation and analysis of models with high-dimensional
￿xed e⁄ects. Relying on micro-level wage regressions with controls for multiple
sources of observed and non-observed heterogeneity, we ￿nd little evidence that the
quality of matching increases with ￿rms￿clustering within the same industry. This
result extends on Freedman (2008), who reached the same conclusion looking at data
for a single manufacturing sector of an undisclosed U.S. state. Our result is obtained
with a more comprehensive panel data set that includes all manufacturing sectors
in the economy. Moreover, we improve on Freedman￿ s (2008) approach by estab-
lishing a precise econometric framework to test the relationship between industrial
clustering and matching. Indeed, Freedman￿ s (2008) conclusions are based on an
ad-hoc comparison of results from the two-￿xed e⁄ects model of Abowd et al. (1999)
with another one that, in line with Woodcock￿ s (2007) three ￿xed e⁄ects model, also
controls for unobservable worker-￿rm match e⁄ects.
Despite having not found much evidence on Marshall￿ s suggestion that localiza-
tion of an industry improves matching, our regressions in columns (6) of Tables 2 and
3 still show a positive and signi￿cant wage premium for clustering. After controlling
for a large variety of sources of heterogeneity, clustering within the same industry still
matters. Thus, the other Marshallian sources of industry-speci￿c external economies
may be at work. At the same time, since in the regressions in columns (6) we rely
solely in time variation to identify the relationship, the learning hypothesis advanced
by Glaeser (1999) and Glaeser & MarØ (2001) is also a plausible explanation. Unob-
16served abilities of workers and ￿rms may evolve over time more positively in clusters
and this source of variation is not captured by the three-￿xed e⁄ects model.
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21Appendix A: Invariance of Transformation in OLS
Consider the following regression model where the matrix of explanatory variables
is partitioned into two sets of regressors, X1 and X2:
Y = X1￿1+X2￿2 + " .
Let b1(Y:X1X2) and b2(Y:X1X2) denote the least squares estimates for ￿1 and ￿2,
respectively. If we replace X2 by Z = X2P where P is a regular matrix then
Y=X1￿1+X2PP
￿1￿2 + " = X1￿1+Z’2 + " .
and it is easily seen that b1(Y:X1X2) = b1(Y:X1Z) and X2b ￿2 = Zb ’2. Consider now a
regression model that includes among its regressors two ￿xed e⁄ects and its interac-
tions. The model can be represented in matrix terms as
Y= X￿ + D1￿1+D2￿2+D3￿ + " ,
where the design matrices D1 and D2 account for the ￿xed e⁄ects and D3 accounts
for the interaction e⁄ect. We assume that super￿ uous columns have been removed
from the design matrices to allow for the identi￿cation of all coe¢ cients. Di⁄erent
parametrizations of the above model can be found by multiplying the design matrices
by a regular transformation matrix. In the particular case of the interaction term
we know that if D3 is multiplied by any regular matrix P then D3b ￿ [the estimate of
￿ij in equations (4a) and (5) in the main text] will remain the same.
Appendix B: Equivalence of Coe¢ cients
Consider again the regression containing two sets of regressors, X1 and X2,
Y = X1￿1+X2￿2 + " , (B.1)
22and the alternative regression model
Y ￿ X2b2(Y:X1X2) = X1￿1+"
Y
￿ = X1￿1 + " , (B.2)
where we replaced ￿2 by its least-squares solution (b2(Y:X1X2)) and rearranged the
terms. Since ￿2 is replaced by its optimal value, the least squares solution obtained

































b(￿:X1) = b1(Y:X1) ￿ b1(Y:X1X2),
what constitutes the well known formula for omitted-variable bias and shows the
equivalence between the coe¢ cients of the regressions. Recalling the regression model
with two ￿xed e⁄ects and interaction,
Y= X￿ + D1￿1+D2￿2+D3￿ + " .




, X2 = D3 and ￿ = D3b ￿ to immediately conclude
that the di⁄erence between the estimated coe¢ cients of the regression with and
without the interaction term is the least squares coe¢ cient of a regression between
the vector of estimated ￿xed e⁄ects (D3b ￿) and the variables in X1. Gelbach (2009)
shows that the asymptotic t-tests of this regression can be interpreted as an extended
version of a Hausman test.
23Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Weighted Sample Unweighted Sample
Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
Worker Characteristics N=5,245,296 N=1,005,886
Real Hourly Wage (euros) 4.579 2.939 4.443 2.792
Female 0.440 0.496 0.449 0.497
Age 37.514 10.978 36.978 11.277
Tenure 10.448 9.321 9.370 8.949
School1 (years=0) 0.004 0.067 0.006 0.075
School2 (0<years<=2) 0.010 0.097 0.011 0.101
School3 (2<years<=4) 0.416 0.493 0.406 0.480
School4 (4<years<=6) 0.292 0.455 0.286 0.438
School5 (6<years<=9) 0.139 0.346 0.146 0.341
School6 (9<years<=12) 0.099 0.299 0.101 0.294
School7 (12<years<=15) 0.012 0.110 0.013 0.107
School8 (years>=16) 0.028 0.165 0.032 0.174
Firm Characteristics N=5,245,296 N=55,573
Private 0.835 0.371 0.981 0.129
Public 0.016 0.126 0.001 0.023
Foreign 0.149 0.126 0.018 0.127
Size 249.502 502.691 15.716 57.483
Location Characteristics I N=5,245,296 N=7,260
Specialization (counts) 93.908 183.835 5.756 23.453
Specialization (employment) 1,651.609 2,731,070 93.563 345.252
Location Characteristics II N=5,245,296 N=272
Urbanization 28,321.860 37,686.640 5,788.414 16,342.230
Area (squared kms) 257.665 205.955 326.656 284.265
24Table 2: Regression Results with Counts
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Specialisation (counts) 0.01002 (37.9) 0.01092 (41.2) 0.01404 (68.1) 0.00904 (29.7) 0.00411 (15.2) 0.00393 (13.8 )
Area - -0.02752 (-57.9) -0.01119 (-31.8) - - -
Female - - -0.23092 (-327.6) -0.23449 (-336.8) - -
Age - - 0.02656 (154.0) 0.02588 (152.5) - -
Age Squared - - -0.00023 (-99.1) -0.00026 (-100.9) - -
Tenure - - 0.01354 (140.1) 0.01321 (139.3) 0.00892 (86.7) -0.01632 (-0.4)
Tenure Squared - - -0.00023 (-72.5) -0.00026 (-70.1) -0.00028 (-114.6) -0.00029 (-104.4)
School1 - - -0.29675 (-90.5) -0.29458 (-93.8) 0.01102 (1.7) 0.01484 (1.9)
School2 - - -0.21922 (-89.7) -0.21322 (-91.6) 0.01480 (5.0) 0.01621 (4.5)
School3 - - -0.11792 (-165.2) -0.11325 (-163.0) 0.00494 (4.8) 0.00828 (5.8)
School5 - - 0.15083 (147.4) 0.13807 (137.4) 0.02217 (16.1) 0.01885 (10.1)
School6 - - 0.29442 (222.1) 0.27743 (211.8) 0.06630 (29.5) 0.05876 (20.8)
School7 - - 0.74844 (214.0) 0.73012 (211.4) 0.17218 (30.1) 0.14450 (21.6)
School8 - - 0.89443 (373.9) 0.87192 (364.8) 0.29048 (49.2) 0.24234 (34.7)
Public - - 0.08966 (36.7) 0.09374 (39.7) -0.04584 (-27.7) -0.04734 (-27.5)
Foreign - - 0.13153 (136.6) 0.11548 (121.3) 0.00939 (11.5) 0.00895 (10.5)
Firm Size - - 0.00006 (79.0) 0.00006 (75.6) 0.00004 (52.5) 0.00004 (51.1)
Urbanization - - - 0.03061 (19.2) 0.00783 (12.3) 0.00849 (12.5)
Fixed Eﬀects
Year Yes [11] Yes [11] Yes [11] Yes [11] Yes [11] Yes [11]
Industry Yes [105] Yes [105] Yes [105] Yes [105] No No
Location No No No Yes [272] No No
Worker No No No No Yes [1,005,886] No
Establishment No No No No Yes [64,883] No
Worker-Establishment No No No No No Yes [1,451,805]
R2 34.1% 34.4% 61.2% 63.1% 93.7% 94.9%
N 5,245,296 5,245,296 5,245,296 5,245,296 5,245,296 5,245,296
Note: t-statistics associated with worker-level cluster-robust standard errors in round brackets; number of ﬁxed eﬀects in square brackets.
25Table 3: Regression Results with Employment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Specialisation (employment) 0.03548 (128.5) 0.03649 (132.2) 0.02463 (114.4) 0.02383 (84.9) 0.01150 (37.8) 0.01147 (35.5 )
Area - -0.02962 (-62.5) -0.01208 (-34.4) - - -
Female - - -0.23025 (-328.2) -0.23452 (-337.6) - -
Age 0.02649 (154.1) 0.02579 (152.3) - -
Age Squared - - -0.00022 (-98.7) -0.00022 (-100.5) - -
Tenure - - 0.01331 (138.2) 0.01304 (137.9) 0.00885 (86.0) -0.01699 (-0.4)
Tenure Squared - - -0.00023 (-72.6) -0.00022 (-70.1) -0.00028 (-113.5) -0.00028 (-103.2)
School1 - - -0.29822 (-91.4) -0.29544 (-94.5) 0.01047 (1.6) 0.01411 (1.8)
School2 - - -0.22119 (-90.7) -0.21463 (-92.4) 0.01460 (5.0) 0.01596 (4.4)
School3 - - -0.11853 (-166.7) -0.11339 (-163.6) 0.00488 (4.7) 0.00818 (5.7)
School5 - - 0.15040 (147.7) 0.13767 (137.4) 0.02202 (16.0) 0.01867 (10.0)
School6 - - 0.29342 (222.5) 0.27679 (211.9) 0.06595 (29.4) 0.05834 (20.7)
School7 - - 0.74532 (214.0) 0.72766 (211.4) 0.17165 (30.0) 0.14385 (21.6)
School8 - - 0.89061 (373.8) 0.86911 (364.6) 0.28983 (49.1) 0.24156 (34.6)
Public - - 0.08524 (35.1) 0.08798 (37.5) -0.04584 (-27.7) -0.04734 (-27.5)
Foreign - - 0.12651 (133.1) 0.11093 (117.4) 0.00873 (10.7) 0.00833 (9.8)
Firm Size - - 0.00004 (53.4) 0.00004 (52.1) 0.00004 (46.5) 0.00004 (45.3)
Urbanization - - - 0.01694 (10.6) 0.00456 (7.2) 0.00506 (7.5)
Fixed Eﬀects
Year Yes [11] Yes [11] Yes [11] Yes [11] Yes [11] Yes [11]
Industry Yes [105] Yes [105] Yes [105] Yes [105] No No
Location No No No Yes [272] No No
Worker No No No No Yes [1,005,886] No
Establishment No No No No Yes [64,883] No
Worker-Establishment No No No No No Yes [1,451,805]
R2 35.0% 35.3% 61.5% 63.3% 93.7% 94.9%
N 5,245,296 5,245,296 5,245,296 5,245,296 5,245,296 5,245,296
Note: t-statistics associated with worker-level cluster-robust standard errors in round brackets; number of ﬁxed eﬀects in square brackets.
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